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KANT'S REPLY TO HUME.

BY JOHN WATSON.

David Hume, as Carlyle has said, was the true intellectual king of the eighteenth century. Nor is his authority any the less real now, because he receives little outward homage. The dead but sceptred sovereign still rules the spirits of many who refuse to be called his subjects. No one who has followed the course of philosophic thought with any care will be surprised either at the real influence or the apparent neglect; for the singleness of purpose and clearness of thought which lend an especial charm and value to the work of the master, are but rarely met with in the halting disciple. And hence there are not a few writers of eminence of our own time who show that they have not been able to receive the lesson it was Hume's mission to teach, by occupying themselves with the futile task of raising a dogmatic system upon a foundation that he has proved to have no stability. One thinker, of remarkable subtlety, seeks to formulate the canons of a science of nature, after expressly reducing nature itself to a procession of vanishing sensations. Another, whose speculations have won the confidence of many leading physicists, maintains that thought is in its very essence

self-contradictory : that neither Materialism nor Idealism is true, but both; that the universe is resolvable into the feelings of the individual, and is yet absolutely independent of those feelings ; and that nothing hinders us from saying unconditionally that consciousness is synonymous with nerve-vibrations, but the equally demonstrable fact that nerve-vibrations are nothing apart from consciousness.

The eager reception of such self-contradictory and anachronistic systems as those of Mill and Spencer, can only be accounted for upon the supposition that, while the premises of the master have been accepted without hesitation, the spirit which animated his philosophy has fled. For Hume has proved, once for all, that absolute Skepticism is the legitimate outcome of the assumption, made by all Empiricists, that knowledge may be explained by an inspection of the individual consciousness. In the supposition that the individual mind is the final court of appeal, it is already implied that subject and object, thought and nature, are abstract opposites, which can in no way be reconciled, and which therefore logically annihilate each other. This however is what the followers of Hume are unable to see ; and hence, instead of letting each side of the opposition develop itself until both vanish, they either preserve the one at the expense of the other, or they allow each alternately to destroy its opposite, and yet very strangely suppose that both survive in their integrity. The former method gives rise to Sensationalism or Materialism, according as the subjective or objective term of the relation is preserved ; the latter to what may be called Indifferentism. Of the three, the two former involve a less sacrifice of logical consistency, while none can put forward any valid plea for acceptance. It thus becomes a matter of the last importance that this veiled Skepticism should be forced to disclose its true nature, and that some estimate should be made of what has already been done for its overthrow and for the reconstruction of knowledge upon a secure foundation. And as the Skepticism latent in Empiricism appears with little disguise in Hume, and the philosophy of Kant was at least believed by its author to be a reply to that Skepticism, a comparison of the main points in the system of each cannot fail to be profitable.

Knowledge, if it is to be more than an empty name, must contain a permanent element that is unaffected by the perpetually changing phases of the individual consciousness. If no such

element can be shown to exist, the supposition that truth is attainable must be rejected as a delusion. Now common consciousness and the special sciences are at one in believing that truth is within the reach of human faculties, and that they are themselves to some extent actually in possession of it. The objective validity of the conceptions of substance and causality—the permanence of objects and the permanence of their connection—is a presupposition which it does not occur to common sense to doubt. The physical sciences in like manner take for granted that there are objects independent of the individual consciousness, and that the laws of their connection are discoverable; while it is a postulate of mathematical science, that its axioms and demonstrations are necessarily and universally valid. There is therefore in the direct or unreflective consciousness in all its forms an unhesitating *belief* that there is in knowledge a universal and permanent element, which is raised above the mutations of the individual mind. This belief may however be incapable of justifying itself; being assumed as a ready-made fact that does not stand in need of proof, it is possible that science, as well as common sense, has been all the time deluding itself by an assumption of stability which a critical investigation will show to be baseless. That such a universal delusion besets the fundamental beliefs of mankind is what Hume, following out the line of thought first consciously entered upon by Locke, has to tell us. Unlike the extreme school of ancient sceptics, he has no quarrel with the facts of consciousness as facts. He admits that people do imagine that substances persist, and that effects flow by necessary sequence from causes; that there is an appearance of knowledge he not only allows but contends; but appearance is not reality, belief is not demonstration. When we come to examine the supposed necessary and universal notions, which the possibility of knowledge presupposes, but which the uncritical mind makes no attempt to justify, we find that their objective validity disappears and gives place to a flux of individual sensations, each of which perishes in the moment of its origination. Nevertheless the delusive appearance of knowledge—the belief that there is in knowledge a universal and necessary element—has to be accounted for, and this is the task with which Hume mainly occupied himself.

Formulating the presuppositions of common sense, Locke had held that all real knowledge is given in a simple and momentary

act of consciousness, and hence that the mind is purely receptive in its acquisition of knowledge. There are two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection, or inner and outer sense. The relations introduced by the spontaneous activity of thought—and thought is in all cases a faculty of relations—do not constitute but destroy reality. But if relations of thought are consistently excluded, no assistance in the derivation of real knowledge can be obtained from the assumption of an external world or of an internal self. Locke however allowed himself to take advantage of both assumptions, and was thus enabled to account for the knowledge of reality, although at the expense of logical consistency. His illegitimate assumption of the relation of individual feeling to an external world was pointed out by Berkeley, his unproved supposition of its relation to an internal self by Hume. All reality has therefore to be sought in unrelated ideas of sensation and reflection, or, in the language of Hume, in impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. These indeed do not exhaust the phenomena of consciousness; impressions are not only originally felt but reproduced, and that in two ways—either in their original or in a new order. These are called by Hume respectively ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. The distinction of an impression and an idea cannot be found in the relation of the former to an external object or an internal self, nor does it consist in any difference in the content of either; and hence Hume places it in greater or less vivacity. An impression is a more vivid, an idea a less vivid feeling; as again an idea of memory is more vivid than an idea of imagination. Whatever reality an idea has, it possesses in the secondary sense of being a copy of an impression; and hence to impressions of sensation and reflection all reality is reducible. The Skepticism of Hume thus lies ready to his hand. The only connection in the objects of knowledge he can admit is that arbitrary order in which feelings succeed each other. There can therefore be no necessary element either in common experience or in the sphere of mathematical or physical truth. There can be no objects in the sense of permanent and identical substances, nor consequently can there be any necessary connection of objects in the way of causality. All reality is reducible to a series of feelings, as they are to the individual, and the supposed identity and causal relation of objects must be explained as an observed uniformity in the order of succession among feelings. Now a feeling, as Hume

himself tells us, is a "perishable passion," and hence all feelings taken together form a mere series, each of which is over before the other begins. No two feelings can be identical with each other, because no feeling can repeat itself; in one word feeling is a multiplicity and nothing but a multiplicity. No real knowledge therefore is possible. There is no object to be known, and if there were, no self to know it; and the belief in the identity and necessary connection of objects is a natural delusion, produced by confounding the subjective necessity of custom with the objective necessity of things.

This sceptical result cannot be consistently avoided by any one who follows the psychological method. The immense superiority of Hume over his recent disciples and imitators is especially manifested in his clear perception of the really crucial question. He saw plainly that, if no necessary relations can be shown to be involved in experience, knowledge in any intelligible sense is a contradiction, and that, on the principles of Sensationalism, which he inherited from Locke, such a necessary element is inadmissible. One cannot but be surprised that, both by Hume's immediate opponents and by his recent followers, the difficulty as to the possibility of knowledge is supposed to be solved when it is said that all knowledge must be based upon the facts of experience. For what is this but a re-statement of the untested *belief*, that what is in consciousness is in consciousness? So understood, the explanation is the mere tautology: consciousness is consciousness, experience is experience. The real point at issue—viz: whether our conscious experience has in it a permanent and universal element, and whether therefore knowledge in any sense that is not unmeaning is possible—is not in this way so much as touched. The true problem of philosophy, as Hume showed with unequalled clearness and force, is: Is knowledge possible at all? or, more definitely, Are the conceptions of substance and causality necessary and objective, or subjective and arbitrary? Moreover, in showing that, if the mind is purely passive in its apprehension of reality, all knowledge must be reduced to immediate and unrelated states of consciousness, none of which persists beyond the moment of its origination, Hume indirectly suggested a way by which the reconstruction of knowledge might be attempted. Neither his mode of stating the problem, nor his suggestive failure to account for knowledge, was lost on Kant. Generalizing the problem of philosophy, Kant saw that

the possibility of knowledge depends upon our capability of returning an appropriate answer to the question, Does experience involve, as its condition, universal and necessary notions? And, as Hume had shown that upon Locke's assumption of the passivity of thought such notions cannot be established, it was suggested to Kant that thought does not passively apprehend objects of experience, but is instrumental in their construction. The relation of Kant and Hume is thus of the closest and most suggestive kind. Both start with experience as it is for the unreflective consciousness; they are agreed in holding that there is in consciousness a belief in the necessity and universality of certain notions, and that truth is unattainable unless this belief can be justified; and both are agreed in holding that feeling in itself is a mere multiplicity, and that if thought is purely receptive nothing but feeling is knowable. On the other hand, Kant denies that mere feeling can be known at all, as Hume had assumed in order to explain the appearance of knowledge; and hence he is led to see that, starting from the facts of consciousness, as apprehended by common sense and the special sciences, we must, to account for their existence, hold that they imply an element which, as contributed by thought, is necessary and universal.

This partial account of the genesis of the *Critical Philosophy* may serve to explain the ambiguity that attaches to certain of Kant's technical terms, and to account for that appearance of contradiction between the earlier and later portions of his work, which obscures his real meaning and has caused the true development of his thoughts to be misunderstood. Beginning with experience, as it is for the individual, Kant's object is, by a critical analysis of it, to separate the contingent element due to feeling from the necessary element contributed by the mind, and thus to prove how experience itself is possible. Hence the term experience is at first used in the ordinary sense as equivalent to the untested facts of consciousness. And, as all untested facts are from their nature received passively, this meaning naturally passes into that in which it is applied to the element of knowledge given to the mind by sense. Finally, the term experience is employed in its strict critical sense, to designate real knowledge, i. e., experience that has been proved to involve a necessary element originated by thought, as well as a contingent element contributed by sense. Closely connected with the difficulty arising from ambiguous language, is an imperfection in Kant's expo-

sition of his system, in which the order of thought is inverted; the consequence of which is that he has to speak provisionally, and make assumptions that have afterwards to be justified. Thus, in the earlier part of the *Kritik* he seems to infer that there is in experience an *a priori* element contributed by thought, because experience contains necessary and universal judgments; whereas his real thought, as we discover in the sequel, can only be correctly expressed by saying exactly the reverse, the proof of the universality and necessity of judgments being that experience is inconceivable except upon the supposition that there is in it an element which as originated by thought is *a priori*.*

The task of Kant then was to prove that the real knowledge which common sense and science suppose they possess, but which remains in them an unproved assumption, is not hopelessly infected by delusion. As has been said, he accepted the conclusion of Hume that sense of itself can only give a multiplicity of isolated impressions, and that if there is no other source of knowledge truth is unattainable. But unfortunately, while he saw the necessity of deducing the necessary element of knowledge from Reason, Kant did not entirely free himself from the false assumption that had led to Hume's skepticism; and hence, biased by the influence of the Wolfian dogmatism, he retained the absolute distinction of subject and object, upon which the Empiricism of Locke rested, even when advancing a theory which rendered it superfluous. Accordingly, while all known phenomena are reduced to the unity of thought, he yet holds that beyond consciousness there is a real object and a real subject, which are not known in themselves but are only implied in their known effects. This dualistic assumption has partially destroyed the purity and harmony of the Critical Philosophy, and, in conjunction with the imperfection of Kant's exposition just referred to, has given color to the false impression that it is only another psychological explanation of knowledge. The psychologist starts from the supposition that the problem of philosophy is to explain how the individual mind, of which the known object is supposed to be the abstract opposite, comes to have a knowledge of that object.

*Mr. Laurie (*Jour. Spec. Philosophy*, Vol. VI., p. 224) charges Kant with assuming that there is a "necessary in propositions," and upon this assumption basing his proof that there are *a priori* judgments. It would be very strange if Kant had assumed that which the *Kritik* was mainly written to establish.

But when the question is thus stated, we are inevitably driven back to the theory of which Hume's skepticism is the logical result, that thought is a purely formal activity. If therefore we insist upon interpreting Kant's system from the dualistic point of view which it undoubtedly presents, we may show it to be infected by the psychological method. The truth is however that the assumption of a noumenal subject and object, while it could not but make its influence felt in Kant's exposition, is quite incompatible with the whole scope and aim of his philosophy. What imperfections exist in his theory from the intermingling of the psychological with the speculative method, will appear as we proceed.

Sense in itself, as Hume has shown, is a mere multiplicity. But a mere multiplicity, as he ought to have maintained, but did not, cannot account even for the phenomena of the individual consciousness. Although Hume was much more consistent than Locke or Berkeley, or their recent followers, he was forced, in order to explain even the appearance of knowledge, inconsistently to assume that sensation is more than a mere multiplicity; that it not only gives the particular, i. e., isolated differences, but also the individual, i. e., a combination of differences. What Kant does is to insist that we shall not surreptitiously foist into the conception of mere difference the contradictory conception of identity, and thus make a show of extracting from sense a unity of differences. Sensation as purely immediate and unrelated, is mere difference. But, in our unreflective consciousness there are individual objects, each of which, as in space, is external to every other, and each part of which for the same reason is external to every other part. Moreover these objects are regarded as persisting through successive moments of time, no two of which co-exist. Whether, therefore we attempt to account for the unity of differences involved in the spatial and temporal relations of objects, or for the unity of determinations of individual objects themselves, we must have recourse to something essentially different from sense. For sense of itself can only give difference; it has no possibility of integration, and therefore is incompetent to account for that unity of differences which even the simplest phenomena of consciousness imply. Before, therefore, we can explain how the individual mind could have a conscious experience of external objects, or of space and time, we must suppose that the differences of sense have been success-

ively apprehended and in that apprehension combined and reduced to unity. While then the differences are receptively apprehended, their combination must be spontaneous. This act of combination Kant calls *Synthesis*, to indicate its spontaneous character, and the faculty which produces synthesis he terms the *Understanding*. That in our ordinary experience a synthesis of the differences of sense is implied, is overlooked when it is supposed that the understanding is a purely analytical faculty. This is the fallacy that vitiates the theory of Locke, as of all Empiricists, and which has as its result the skepticism of Hume. The very fact that we can analyze our ordinary conception of objects, is of itself a proof that a synthesis of the understanding must have gone before; for although knowledge in its earliest stage is in a confused and partially indeterminate state, and therefore stands in need of analysis, still had there been no prior synthesis of differences, there would have been nothing whatever to analyze.

The necessity of a synthesis by the understanding of the mere difference of sense, as the condition of even the simplest experience, has been proved; but much more is required to establish that there is in knowledge a necessary and universal element. The combination of differences evidently cannot be effected by sense, as the Empiricist supposes, but must be produced spontaneously by the understanding. It is competent however for an objector to say that the synthesis of the understanding is perfectly arbitrary, and hence that we can have no certainty that truth is attainable. If we can combine determinations in any way we please, obviously the product of this combination will not be objective knowledge. To place knowledge upon a sure foundation we must be able to show that there is a supreme principle which regulates the synthesis of the understanding; that the unity to which sensuous determinations is reduced is not the result of an arbitrary combination, but on the contrary that the combination is itself absolutely conditioned by a necessary unity.

And here it may not be out of place to point out that Kant does not regard sense and thought as giving different kinds of knowledge, but only as contributing elements of knowledge, which in themselves are mere zero. We should hardly have thought it necessary to insist upon this distinction had not Mr. Lewes in his recent work repeated the charge, first advanced by

him in his "History of Philosophy," that Kant absolutely separates the sensibility from the understanding, and regards the one as capable of being exercised apart from the other. Kant, says Mr. Lewes, "after first defining knowledge to be the product of a subjective element and an objective element, henceforward treats the subjective element as if it alone contributes a peculiar kind of knowledge, and not simply one of the factors of knowledge."* Now if we are resolved to adhere to the mere letter of the *Kritik*, many statements might be produced which, taken by themselves, would seem to substantiate this charge. But the doctrine that sense in itself affords but a possibility of knowledge, which only becomes actual upon the exercise of the synthetic understanding, is so fundamental a distinction in the Critical Philosophy that to overlook or obliterate it is to render the whole system meaningless. If sense in itself gives one kind of knowledge, it must of course be a knowledge of individual objects, and hence thought necessarily takes up the place of a purely formal activity, which has no other task than that of abstracting certain attributes from the completely determined object, and recombining them in a perfectly arbitrary way. It thus becomes not synthetical but analytical; and when Kant represents the problem of philosophy as comprehended in the question, How are synthetical *a priori* judgments possible? we must suppose that he did not understand what he himself meant, and thus fell into an elaborate *ignoratio elenchi*! On the other hand, there is a side of the Kantian philosophy, to which reference has already been made, that may be said logically to overthrow the relativity of sense and thought; but only because it destroys the possibility of any knowledge whatever. By absolutely opposing the noumenal self to the noumenal object, Kant lent countenance to the fundamental fallacy of Empiricism—a fallacy which Mr. Lewes endorses, and which therefore it is not competent for him to object to in another—that the mind is purely passive in its apprehension of knowledge. If we carry out this assumption to its consequences, we shall no doubt be led to say, not only that sense gives one kind of knowledge, but that it gives all knowledge worthy of the name. The ultimate issue of this mode of thought we have already seen to be the skepticism of Hume, which, on the ground that sensation is immediate and moment-

*Problems of Life and Mind, American Ed., Vol. I. p. 405.

ary, denies the possibility of any knowledge of reality. But this psychological point of view, although it is distinctly countenanced by Kant, can only be regarded as a superficial flaw which leaves his philosophy in its essential features unimpaired. The thing-in-itself is in Kant an unwarranted presupposition, which may easily be separated from his system, and very much to its improvement in simplicity and self-consistency. As it is, it necessarily exercised a pernicious influence, which may be traced in the most purely speculative part of the *Kritik*, the reduction of all knowledge to the unity of self-consciousness, to which we now proceed.

To prove the possibility of real knowledge we must be able to show that there is a primal unity, which is the necessary condition of the synthesis of the understanding. In our ordinary experience we have a consciousness of individual objects as existing in space and time. Such a consciousness cannot be accounted for upon the supposition that sense gives us a knowledge of objects, for sensation is in itself bare difference. The mind must not only apprehend the difference of sense, but by an intellectual synthesis combine it. But such a synthesis is only possible if there is something which contains in itself no difference—something which is absolutely self-identical. Now it is evident from a mere analysis of our ordinary consciousness that in each of our perceptions the consciousness of self is implied; for an unperceived perception—a perception that is not in consciousness—is a contradiction. This consciousness of self is however simply accepted as a fact, without being proved or in any way accounted for; and hence it may be said, as Hume did say, that self, like the object, is an illusion which philosophy dispels. It will not therefore do to prove the reality of self by a mere appeal to the individual consciousness; for all that can in this way be established is that there is in our ordinary consciousness a *belief* in the reality of self. What we have to show is that the consciousness of self is the necessary condition of the belief in self. Now it has been shown that sense *per se* is a mere multiplicity, and hence that, to account for the empirical consciousness of objects, the understanding must combine this multiplicity. The possibility of such a combination has to be accounted for, and that which is to account for it must have in itself no difference, or a higher synthesis would again be required to reduce this difference to unity. The conscious *I* however exactly meets the requirement.

The *I* is a pure identity; it is absolutely one and the same in all perceptions, as an analysis of the empirical consciousness is sufficient to show. The various determinations which in their totality constitute one perception would not be in consciousness at all, did they not belong to one and the same self-consciousness. It is only by going through the separate determinations of sense and summing them up that they can be in one consciousness, and being in one consciousness they are related to an absolutely identical self. Were there no universal self lying at the basis of knowledge, we could not have even the consciousness of the difference of sense as a difference; and on the other hand if there were nothing but the identity of self we could not have the consciousness of self as identical. Actual experience and the possibility of its extension, alike involve as their condition a synthesis of sensuous differences by an absolutely identical self. The fact that when I analyze my empirical consciousness I detect the presence of self in each perception, implies that self-consciousness is the necessary condition of synthesis, just as synthesis is the condition of analysis. The synthetical unity of self-consciousness is thus the highest principle of all knowledge, and hence it may be called the "original unity of self-consciousness;" and as it is the condition of the necessary element of knowledge, it may be termed the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness." The possibility of experience thus involves that the variety of sense should be reflected upon the identity of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is therefore the absolutely necessary condition of all knowledge.

The synthetical unity of self-consciousness, as it is the central truth of the Critical Philosophy, so it is the highest point of pure speculation to which Kant attained. Interpreted in its true spirit, and liberated from a certain inconsistency (to be immediately considered) that vitiates its actual presentation, it ought to commend itself to the "inductive" logician not less than to the speculative thinker. To the former it should appeal as a successful instance of the advance of knowledge "from the known to the unknown" by the verification of an hypothesis. Starting from admitted "facts of experience," it goes on to explain them by a principle that binds them together by a necessary law; setting up the hypothesis that self-consciousness is competent to explain the given phenomena, it tests the hypothesis by the phenomena, and finds that it, and it alone, is competent to account

for them. Nor can it be said that Kant flies beyond the bounds of possible experience in search of his principle of explanation; for surely, since Descartes' "*Cogito ergo sum*," all are agreed that the consciousness of self is the simplest and most certain of "facts." Why then do our Empiricists obstinately refuse to accept so irrefragable an instance of induction? May it not be that their favorite formula of the progress "from the known to the unknown," and their no less favorite maxim that induction involves the "verification of hypotheses," are barren truisms that no sane person would dispute, but which tell us no more than the "trifling propositions" that stirred the wrath of Locke by their pretentious emptiness? Surely we are all agreed that if any advance in knowledge is to be made, it must be by knowing something we did not know before; and that to find out the law which regulates any given phenomena we must hazard a conjecture, which can only be accepted if it turns out to be correct. But after these "wise saws" have received due homage, the only really important question—the value of the explanation offered—is as far from being settled as ever. Now in the present instance, that which prevents the Empiricist from gratefully accepting Kant's solution—as he certainly ought to do, seeing that it places "experience" upon a solid basis—is the preconception that the object of thought stands in absolute opposition to the self that thinks it. Under this false supposition he seeks to overthrow the logical law of contradiction (for which he should have more respect) by trying violently to bring the object into relation with the subject, each being implicitly defined as the contradictory of the other. Hence when Kant brings forward a principle which is to explain knowledge by showing that self and not-self, as strictly correlative, are meaningless when taken in abstraction from each other, the Empiricist replies reproachfully that this is to take the "high *priori* road" that leads away from experience and loses itself in mist. The charge is undoubtedly just if by "experience" is to be understood the object in isolation from the subject; but if it means, as it ought to mean, the *totality* of experience, the synthesis of subject and object, it is the Empiricist, and not Kant, who violates the integrity of experience.

But, however innocuous may be the assaults of Empiricism, the disturbing element, to which reference has more than once been made, would not allow the central doctrine of the Critical Phi-

losophy to remain uncontaminated by contradiction. Taken strictly, the conception of self-consciousness as the principle which unites subject and object in a higher unity, is fatal to the presupposition of a thing-in-itself, which as beyond consciousness is unknowable. By simply holding fast the two correlatives, we get the conception of a self-consciousness that is neither an abstract universal nor a mere particular, but at once universal and particular, and therefore individual. To suppose that there is an unknown self and an unknown object, in addition to the known self and the known object, is to advance an hypothesis that is at once unnecessary and self-contradictory. But Kant was not prepared to surrender the thing-in-itself, and hence we find him, after he has enunciated the strict correlativity of self and not-self, falling back into the psychological point of view which Hume had shown to be contradictory of knowledge. For immediately after he has spoken of self-consciousness as the unifying principle of all knowledge, and therefore in effect as the unity of subject and object, he goes on to remark that the *I*, being an absolutely simple unity, contains no difference in itself, and must therefore have difference given to it by sense. Hence he deliberately and emphatically rejects the suggestion that the understanding may be perceptive. There may, he admits, possibly be a self-consciousness which originates the determinations of which it is conscious, but of such a self-consciousness we can form no positive conception. In other words, the difference of sense, although it has no existence apart from consciousness, is nevertheless in its origin due to the noumenal object and not to reason. Now by thus denying to thought any capacity of originating difference, Kant virtually makes the original self-consciousness a bare unit, and thus identifies it with the abstraction of self, which is the negation of not-self; and hence he is debarred from giving any consistent explanation of the relation of subject and object. Even in this imperfect form, his theory successfully explodes the fallacy of Empiricism, which assumes that sense of itself gives a knowledge of objects, i. e., of a unity of differences. But, on the other hand, a purely abstract self is as incapable of accounting for the *difference* which all knowledge involves, as mere sense is of explaining its *unity*. No doubt if knowledge is possible at all there must be a synthesis of differences; but how can any synthesis be produced by a self-consciousness which is so defined as to exclude all difference? That

the self is in its own nature a unity—or rather a *unit*, for unity necessarily implies difference—does not help us to understand how it introduces unity into that which is conceived as its abstract opposite. Self is a mere unit, not-self is mere difference, and so they must remain in eternal isolation, unless we can point to a principle which is in itself a synthesis of unity and difference. This principle must be neither self nor not-self, but that which in transcending combines both. Kant sees this clearly enough; but, unable to break loose from the fetters of the thing-in-itself, he confuses self-consciousness with the abstract self, and stumbles in the very moment of victory. Hence if we mete out praise to him strictly upon the ground of what he has achieved, without taking into consideration the scope and intention of his efforts and the near approach he made to complete success, we may say that he has rather given an exceptionally clear statement of the problem of philosophy than a true solution of it. The follower of Kant has therefore only two courses open to him: either to hold fast by the unknowable thing-in-itself, and the consequent abstraction of self; or to deny the reality of the indemonstrable noumenon, when the conception of self-consciousness as a unity that transcends the opposition of self and not-self, will follow as a matter of course. If he decides to adopt the former alternative, he must be prepared to throw in his lot with Empiricism, and therefore with Skepticism, which attends it as its shadow. For when self is conceived as the abstract of not-self, thought can only be a formal activity; and hence the wealth of reality is thrown out of the orderly domain of Reason and given over to the lawless realm of Sense. If, on the other hand, he choose the alternative that self-consciousness is implicitly both subject and object, he will see that knowledge is placed upon a foundation that cannot be moved; being the self-evolution of Reason, which, in universalizing the particular, realizes itself in the concrete individual.

After establishing that the difference of sense is reduced to unity by a synthesis of the understanding, of which self-consciousness is the only possible condition, Kant goes on to ask what are the special forms that that synthesis takes. Hitherto it has only been shown that no knowledge is possible unless we suppose that sensuous determinations are combined by the spontaneous activity of thought. We can easily see that, however contingent may be the sensuous material given to thought, the

various modes of reducing this material to the unity of self-consciousness must be necessary. But to find out what these modes are, and to be sure that we have discovered them in their completeness, we must have some clue to guide us in our search. All intellectual synthesis being a manifestation of one absolutely identical self, the understanding is a complete unity; and hence it must be possible to find some one principle that will lead to the discovery of all the ways in which it combines the variety of sense. Now to reduce variety to unity is to judge, and hence all thinking is judging. Judgment is either analytical or synthetical; and, as all analysis implies a prior synthesis, the various forms of the analytical judgment will afford a clue to the different manifestations of the synthetical judgment. Formal logic, which abstracts from all content of knowledge, has already tabulated the forms of the analytical judgment. In our ordinary experience we have a consciousness not only of individual objects, but of general conceptions. It is with the formal relation of these conceptions to each other that common logic deals. Conceptions are generalizations from individual perceptions. Comparing a number of individuals together and noting their points of agreement, we form general conceptions. We may next compare together the conceptions thus obtained, and by a like process of abstraction, form higher conceptions; and this process we may repeat until we have obtained a conception that includes all individuals under it. The act by which we reduce a number of perceptions to conceptions, or a number of conceptions to others of a higher degree of generality, is judgment. And as conceptions can only be employed in judging, the only office of the understanding is to judge, i. e., to refer conceptions to objects through perceptions. An analysis of the various forms of judgment thus affords an infallible clue to the different conceptions used by the understanding in the synthetical judgment. Applying this principle, Kant finds that all judgments may be classified according to their quantity, quality, modality and relation, each of which has under it three phases, and that to these phases there correspond as many pure conceptions, or categories. These categories then are the different ways in which the understanding reduces the material of sense to unity. Thus the permanent element of knowledge, which Hume had denied to exist, has been found. The categories, as belonging to the very constitution of thought, cannot be reduced to an arbitrary order in our

feelings, inasmuch as, without presupposing them, no experience even of a series of feelings as they are to the individual could have taken place. They are therefore necessary and universal.

In this account of the way in which he was led to the discovery of the categories, Kant attempts to comprehend the analytical and synthetical judgments under one formula. To think, he tells us, is to judge, and judging consists in referring conceptions to objects through perceptions. Now in strict propriety this formula is only applicable to the analytical judgment, the common view of which rests upon the supposition that individual objects, with the full complement of their attributes, first exist full-formed in consciousness, and are afterwards referred to an abstract universal. If, following the analogy which the account naturally suggests, we attempt to assimilate the synthetical to the analytical judgment, we shall naturally be led to think that objects as such being given by perception, the understanding proceeds to apply to them its categories. We might suppose, e. g., that on entering a room our senses reveal to us a number of individual objects, which the understanding afterwards combines by means of such categories as unity, plurality and totality. It must be under some such misapprehension that Mr. Lewes charges Kant with holding that sense and thought contribute different *kinds* of knowledge. Kant's real thought is, that by the application of the categories to the *element* of knowledge given by sense, objects are first constituted as objects. This, no one who has apprehended the relation of the categories to the synthetical unity of self-consciousness, can fail to understand. Self-consciousness, as we have seen, is the absolute condition of all knowledge, no matter how rudimentary or confused it may be. The isolated impressions contributed by sense would have no existence even in the changing consciousness of the individual, were they not reduced to unity by an all-pervasive and identical self. But to refer the manifold of sensation to a universal self is to think it, and therefore to bring it under the unity of the categories. The categories are thus the condition of the perception of objects; and hence we must suppose the analytical judgment to imply the synthetical, as the analytical unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetical unity. For the analytical judgment in all cases brings one or more individuals under an abstract universal, either mediately or immediately; and hence it assumes

the individual to be already known. This assumption has to be justified, and its justification lies in the necessity of supposing a prior synthesis of individual impressions to account for conscious experience. It is true that the office of the categories in the synthetical judgment is not only to constitute objects as such, but also to connect them; but the process by which they are connected with each other is not divergent from that by which they are constituted, but strictly continuous with it.

Interpreted in its spirit, Kant's derivation of the categories is inconsistent with the assumed opposition of the synthetical and analytical judgments. If self-consciousness is conceived, as Kant in his higher moments does conceive it, as the unity which transcends the opposition of subject and object, the analytical must be regarded as strictly correlative with the synthetical judgment. The isolated impressions of sense are only knowable in so far as they are distinguished from each other, and in that distinction related to a universal self. But this implies on the one hand an analytical judgment which distinguishes one determination from another, and on the other hand a synthetical judgment which unites the determinations thus distinguished. Take away either the judgment which differentiates or the judgment which integrates, and knowledge becomes impossible. Thus knowledge is neither mere synthesis nor mere analysis, but a unity of both. It is the self-determination of Reason, which in manifesting itself at once differentiates and integrates. For how can the synthetical judgment combine elements that without analysis would have no existence? and how can there be any analysis without a corresponding synthesis? These are not separate processes, but correlative aspects of the same process. The same presupposition, however, that prevented Kant from clearly apprehending and retaining the absolute unity of subject and object in self-consciousness, led him to contrast the synthetical and analytical judgments as distinct and opposite processes. That presupposition, it need hardly be said, was that the particular is given to the mind by the unknown thing-in-itself. For, the particular being thus taken up ready-made, the only task left for thought to perform is to reduce it to unity. Hence the understanding, in so far as it is constructive, is supposed to form synthetical judgments alone; and hence also the categories are conceived as empty forms of combination that receive their filling from an external source. The result is that the analytical judgment is de-

graded to the rank of a purely formal activity, instead of being regarded as not less constitutive of knowledge than the synthetical judgment.

Kant could not overlook the fact that analysis plays an important part in the development of knowledge; but, misled by the false assumption that all necessary relations are constituted by the synthetical judgment, no other course was left open to him than to hold that analysis merely resolves objects, that are already known in their completeness, back into their original elements. Accordingly he plays into the hands of the formal logician, maintaining that thought as analytical refers objects to abstract universals, or, in other words, separates from them the attributes by which they are already constituted. But this is to identify judgment with memory, and to fall into a lifeless nominalism. If objects in their completeness, i. e., in the sum of their relations to other objects, already exist in consciousness, thought can only by introspection recall them as they are suggested by a given name. In strict propriety therefore we cannot say that the analytical judgment brings individuals under the unity of a conception, for the attributes designated by a term are already supposed to be given as united. And hence Kant, in assuming that the analytical judgment is a reliable guide to all the forms of the synthetical judgment, goes upon a false principle, the influence of which is shown in the incompleteness and want of connection of his list of categories. That he was led to a discovery of certain of the categories, notwithstanding his derivation of them from the superficial analysis of common logic, is due to the fact that the analytical judgment, as he conceived it, is a repetition in an inverse order of the actual process of thought. The syllogism is a disintegration of the elements put together by thought in its constructive activity; and hence it does serve as a clue, although an imperfect one, to the discovery of the categories.

Little more is needed to complete Kant's proof of the possibility of a real knowledge of objects in their connection. The difference of sense, it has been shown, must be referred to the unity of self-consciousness in order to be known at all; to refer sensuous differences to a universal self is to think them, and thus to bring them under the categories. But here the difficulty arises that the categories are merely the ways in which thought may combine a difference that is given to it, and the differences of

sense are in complete isolation from each other; and hence we cannot, without supposing something that shall mediate between the categories on the one hand and the sensuous differences on the other, explain how actual knowledge can take place. But if we look again at what is involved in experience, we shall see that the consciousness of objects, as possessed of qualities and as related to each other, implies that they exist in Time and Space. And here we come upon the last element required to constitute experience. For Time and Space can be resolved neither into the mere difference of sense, nor into the unity of thought: not the former, because they must be presupposed before we can explain to ourselves how sensuous differences can come within the sphere of consciousness: not the latter, because Space and Time are complete unities in themselves. It was by supposing that sensuous differences are given as coexistent and successive that Hume was able to make a show of deriving Space and Time from sensation. But when we simply hold fast by what he himself states, that sensation *per se* is bare difference, we see that Space and Time, as unities, must be referred to some other source. They are therefore not given from without, but supplied from within, and hence they are *a priori*. And just as little can they be identified with the categories of the understanding as with the differences of sense; they are indeed unities, but not unities which may comprehend under them an infinite variety of differences supplied from some other source; their unity and their difference are implied in themselves, all parts of space and time being limitations of one space and one time. They are therefore perceptions. Space and time have thus the peculiar characteristic of being akin on the one hand to the categories, and on the other to the differences of sense; and hence they are fitted to mediate between the two. As pure forms they lie *a priori* in the mind, and thus thought can act through them upon the manifold of sense supplied by the transcendental object. Thus we can understand how we may have experience of objects in their connection. When we analyze experience we find that it involves these elements: (1) isolated sensations, (2) the pure forms of space and time, (3) the categories and (4) self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is absolutely the highest condition of all knowledge; the categories stand under it, as its modes of reducing the manifold of sense to unity; space and time are the formal conditions of the apprehension of sensation; and through them

the latter is brought into connection with the categories, and thus referred to the unity of self-consciousness.

Thus the possibility of knowledge has been proved, and by implication its limits prescribed. That there is a necessary and universal element in experience is established from the impossibility of accounting for experience upon any other supposition; and that we can have no knowledge except within the bounds of experience is involved in the fact that sense must contribute the element of difference before we can even be conscious of self as identical. For thought can only be exercised upon condition that a manifold of sense shall be given to it; and as this manifold is itself conditioned by the forms of space and time, we can have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself, which is out of space and time. It is true that thought could reduce any manifold whatever to unity, provided only that it were sensuous; but so far as our knowledge is concerned this capacity is valueless, since we can have no sensible experience except that which is given in space and time. While therefore within the limits of experience, our knowledge is beyond the assaults of Skepticism, the conditions of possible knowledge preclude us from ever knowing more than phenomena.

We had intended to point out, somewhat in detail, how completely the Critical Philosophy of Kant meets the philosophy of Hume, both in its positive and negative aspects: proving on the one hand that mere sensation cannot account even for a series of feelings, as they are to the individual, and therefore not for that limited amount of certainty which Hume inconsistently allowed to the mathematical and physical sciences; and on the other hand destroying the basis of his Skepticism by showing that the necessary element of knowledge cannot be the product of custom or repeated association, since custom itself implies the constructive activity of thought. Had space permitted we should also like to have made some remarks upon Kant's conception of space and time as purely subjective—a conception which, like the other imperfections in his system, to which reference has been made, flows from the assumption of an unknown thing-in-itself—and upon his limitation of knowledge to phenomena. But perhaps enough has been said to show that the Critical Philosophy, while its purity is so far polluted by the intermingling of absolute Realism with absolute Idealism, nevertheless gave the death-blow to Empiricism; and that it clearly pointed out the way to a thor-

oughly consistent philosophy, which should explain all reality as the externalization of Reason, working through and yet independent of the consciousness of the individual. The Empiricist should learn from a study of Kant that the only reality his own premises will allow him to retain is that which remains after all thought and existence have vanished; and the less prejudiced reader, in making the thought of Kant his own, may perhaps be led to see the necessity of cleansing it of all taint of Empiricism.

DARWIN'S DESCENT OF MAN.

(A Few Thoughts and Queries Suggested on Reading Darwin's Introduction to his fifth edition of "The Origin of Species, and Descent of Man").

BY J. H. PEPPER.

Darwin commences by begging the question and talks at the commencement of "*prejudices against his views*;" as much as to say that he alone is right, and that other people are so stupid and bigoted, they will not change their minds on a subject that nature alone can teach them, and the knowledge thus acquired appears to ignorant observers to be all against Darwin, because no one has yet heard or read of a monkey being anything but a monkey, a codfish a codfish, a jelly fish a jelly fish, a cell a cell, &c., &c., &c.

Darwin says "man must be included with all other organic beings in any general conclusion respecting his manner of appearance on this earth." Granted as we allow (at least a large section of the Christian world) that Father, Son and Holy Ghost is one God, but each separate and distinct, as we allow that red, yellow and blue waves come from one wave of white light, but all distinct and having separate qualities. "Species are the modified descendants of other species." Very true again, but each species belongs to its species, and you cannot raise a continuous species by uniting a horse and a donkey, and if you do it the result is a mule, which can no longer generate its species,